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Abstract
This paper investigates the effects of sectoral diversification on the Chinese banks’ return and risk using panel data on 16
Chinese listed commercial banks during the 2007-2011 period. We construct another new diversification measure, taking 
systematic risk of different sectors into consideration by weighting them with their betas and compare the results with those
of more conventional measure HHI. We find that sectoral diversification is associated with reduced return and also
decreased risk at the same time, which however, contradicts existing findings in developed countries and also in emerging 
economies.
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1. Introduction
This paper investigate empirically how credit portfolio diversification affects banks’ return and risk in
Chinese banking system from the aspect of sector. In real world, we observe both diversification and 
concentration strategies. On one hand, several countries possess rules limiting a bank’s exposure to a single 
borrower [1]. On the other hand, however, some banks decide to involve in sectors which they have expertise
and enjoy comparative advantages. Subprime crisis, in the year 2008, which later lead to global financial crisis
is partly due to too much exposures to real estate industry which is highly related to macro economy [2]. This
crisis, caused by credit portfolio concentration, in return, hit the whole banking industry of US heavily. In the
light of financial crisis, diversification versus concentration has become one of the most important issues to be
discussed concerning financial stability.
* Corresponding author.
E-mail address:chenyibing10@mails.ucas.ac.cn; weixh@ucas.ac.cn; zll933@163.com; yshi@ucas.ac.cn
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
1738   Yibing Chen et al. /  Procedia Computer Science  18 ( 2013 )  1737 – 1746 
Should banks diversify their loans or concentrate on those firms whose business they are familiar with? 
There are some research works on the relationship between diversification and performance of banks, however 
there is no consensus so far, because findings of different countries vary, with evidences supporting both 
opinions. 
On one hand, traditional banking theory suggests that banks should diversify their loans to decrease credit 
risk, which is also in accordance with portfolio theory [3]. The view is due to asymmetric information, 
diversification reduces financial intermediation costs [4]. In practice, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(1991) reported that many banking crises in the last three decades were caused by concentration, indicating that 
risk is highly associated with diversification. Empirical studies in Argentina and Austria are in favor of this 
point of view [5, 6]. 
On the other hand, corporate finance theory states that firms would enjoy additional benefits resulting from 
reduced cost if they concentrate their activities on specific sectors which they have expertise in or are familiar 
with [7]. In addition, the diversification strategy is less attractive because it also induces competition [8]. 
Empirical evidence can be found to support this argument in Italian banking sector, German banking sector, 
Brazilian banking sector and small European banks [7, 9-11]. 
However, the existing literatures on diversification versus concentration are heavily concentrated in US and 
Europe markets. To the best of our knowledge, however, only Berger, Hasan and Zhou investigated this issue 
in Chinese banking sector from the geographical and loans, deposit and assets diversification leaving the field 
in developing countries much unexamined [12]. 
The primary goal of this paper is to analyze how credit portfolio sectoral concentration affects Chinese bank 
profitability and risk, which is different from previous work of Chinese banking system focusing on overall 
diversification. An important contribution of our work is that we do not only consider sectoral concentration, 
but also systematic risk of sectors themselves. Concentration does associate with risk, but concentration on 
those sectors which are more volatile and closely related with economic upturns and downturns brings more 
risk. To address the problem, we construct a new diversification measure, taking systematic risk of different 
sectors into consideration by weighting them with their betas. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our methodology, defining the 
variables of interest and the empirical models. Our data will be described in details in Section 3. Section 4 
displays our empirical results and Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. Methodology 
2.1. Diversification Measures 
Previous research works applied several commonly-used traditional diversification measures including 
Hirschman-Herfindhl (HHI) [9, 12] and the Shannon Entropy (SE) [10, 13]. Some of the papers also use 
distance-based diversification measures to compare the differences between credit portfolio composition and a 
benchmark. In most of the cases, the industry composition of the economy’s market portfolio is a benchmark 
for diversification. Distance-based diversification measures therefore take the differences in sizes of each sector 
into consideration [10, 14]. We choose Herfindhl-Hirschman Index as the basic measure of diversification, and 
also construct a new one based on it, taking systematic risk of each sector into consideration. 
2.1.1 Hirschman-Herfindhl Index (HHI) 
Hirschman-Herfindhl Index (HHI) is a commonly used accepted measure of market concentration. It 
assumes perfect diversification as equal exposure to every sector. 
Before we calculate the diversification measure, for each bank, relative exposure itx  of each sector i  at 
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time t  is defined as its nominal exposure itex  divided by the total exposure
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HHI is the sum of the squares of the relative exposures. And thus for each individual bank, it is defined as: 
 
2
1
N
t it
i
HHI x  (2) 
where N  is the total number of sectors the banks provide their lending to.  
2.1.2 Risk-adjusted HHI 
Traditional HHI equals relative exposure of every sector; however, sector itself has different systematic risk 
as the whole economy moves up and down. Lessons learned from banking crises of the 1980s and early 1990s 
taught us that banks should not exposure too much to only few sectors [15]. Subprime crisis was partly due to 
too much exposure to real estate industry which has especially high correlations with macro economy [2]. 
To adjust systematic risk of each sector, we extend our diversification measurement based on HHI by 
introducing sector betas as weights of relative exposures. We construct new diversification risk-adjusted HHI 
for each bank at time t  as follows: 
risk-adjusted 2
1
N
t it it
i
HHI x  (3) 
 
In Eq (3), it  reflects systematic risk of each sector i  at time t , defined as the covariance between market 
return and sector return cov (R ,R )Mt it  divided by the variance of market return
2
MtR
: 
2
cov (R ,R )
=
Mt
Mt it
it
R
 (4) 
 
The high risk-adjusted HHI value means not only the bank’s credit portfolio is more concentrated, but also 
focused too much on the sectors with higher systematic risk. 
 2.2. Dependent Variables 
In this part, we briefly introduce the dependent variables and other control variables we use in our regression 
models. 
2.2.1 Return Performance Measures 
 Return on assets (ROA): measured as the ratio of net income to total assets. 
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 Return on Equity (ROE): measured as the ratio of net income to equity. The measure is to describe the 
return performance of the bank from the perspective of stockholders. 
 We use both the measures for robustness check. 
2.2.2 Risk Measure 
 Nonperforming loans: we evaluate the banks’ monitoring effectiveness. The variable is interpreted as 
an ex post measure of the actual losses from lending activity, and easy to be found in the banks’ annual reports. 
2.3. Other Control Variables 
 Asset: we use the continuous variable to measure the size of the bank. In our regression analysis, 
squared term   along with   are also introduced to capture for the potential nonlinear relationship between size 
and risk when the linear relationship is not significant. 
 Loan-to-deposit ratio: total loan divided by total deposit, as the measure of liquidity. 
 Equity ratio: equity divided by the total assets, reflecting the capital structure of the bank. 
2.4. Model Specification 
2.4.1 The relationship between bank returns and credit portfolio diversification 
The basic question in this study is whether loan sectoral diversification yields higher returns. We deal with 
this issue by regressing returns on diversification measures, while controlling other important variables in the 
following equation. 
 
0 1kt k kt kt ktreturn diversification V  (5) 
 
Where ktreturn  is the return of bank k  at time t  measured by ROA and also ROE. ktV  is a vector of 
control variables including asset, loan-to-deposit ratio and equity ratio. ktdiversification is the variable we are 
interested in, representing separately HHI and risk-adjusted HHI explained in the previous subsection. Finally, 
kt  is the residual value. 
In addition, we also test the nonlinear relationship between credit loan diversification and banks’ return by 
introducing squared term 2ktdiversification  into the regression. 
 
2
0 1 2kt k kt kt kt ktreturn diversification diversification V  (6) 
 
If the regression model is significant, it seems to suggest that there exists U-shaped or reversed U-shaped 
relationship between diversification and banks’ return. 
2.4.2 The impact of credit portfolio diversification on bank risk 
This topic is to test how loan sectoral diversification impacts risk. We regress risk measure on 
diversification measures in the following equation. Asset, loan-to-deposit ratio and equity ratio are included in 
the regression as control variables. 
 
0 1kt k kt kt ktrisk diversification V  (7) 
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Where ktrisk  is the risk of bank k  at time t  measured by nonperforming loans. Since we evaluate the 
banks’ monitoring effectiveness, absolute value of nonperforming loans is used. ktdiversification is separately 
HHI and risk-adjusted HHI explained in the previous subsection. Finally, kt  is the residual value. 
In our regression analysis, squared term 2ln ( )asset  along with ln( )asset  are also introduced to capture for 
the potential nonlinear relationship between size and risk when the linear relationship is not significant. 
In addition, we also test the potential nonlinear relationship such as U-shaped or reversed U-shaped 
between credit loan diversification and banks’ return by introducing squared term 2ktdiversification  into the 
regression. 
 
2
0 1 2kt k kt kt kt ktrisk diversification diversification V  (8) 
 
3. Data 
3.1. Sample and Data Source 
In China, there are 16 listed commercial banks. These banks take a large asset proportion of the whole 
banking sector. Our sample includes panel data of all the 16 Chinese listed commercial banks in 2007-2011 
period, 80 observations in total. These commercial banks began to adopt new accounting new standards in 2007. 
Besides, in the period of 2007-2001, Chinese banking sector was developing stably without significant reforms. 
Therefore, our choice of the time period helps to examine the stable relationship between diversification and 
banks’ return and risk. 
Sector exposures of every listed commercial bank of the five years are from their annual reports. They 
directed their loans to the following sectors: farming, forestry, husbandry and fishing (A); mining (B); 
manufacturing (C), production and supply of electric power (D), gas and water (E); construction (F); 
transportation and warehousing (G); information technology (H); wholesale and retail trade (I); finance and 
insurance (J); real estate (K); social service (L, including science, education and health); communication and 
culture (M), etc. Their classification of sectors is mainly in accordance with the 13-sector classification 
standard set by CSRC; therefore, we only adjust some of their reported sector loan exposures to ensure 
consistency between the 16 banks and also the 13-sector classification standard. Return performance measures 
and risk measure is from Wind database. We also double check them with those on the banks’ annual reports. 
 
3.2. HHI and Risk-adjusted HHI Calculation 
Definition and classification of sectors in the 16 listed commercial banks’ loan exposures reports show slight 
differences in some sectors. We adjust the inconsistent ones to ensure that we can compare the calculated HHI 
between the banks and also between the different years. The 16 listed banks all reported their exposures in the 
following sectors: B, C, D, E, F, H, and J in 13-sector classification standard. 
However, some of the banks classified one, some or the entire Sector A, G, I, M into “others”, and the rest 
banks reported them separately if they provided loans to any of Sector A, G, I, M. Besides, some banks had 
their own sector “science, education, culture and health”, “public service” in their reporting, while other 
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confirmed to 13-classification regulation in which “communication and culture” is an independent sector. To 
overcome the inconsistency, we adjust our classification standard shown as Table 1. 
Table 1. Adjusted sector classification standard 
No Description Sector code 
I1 mining B 
I2 manufacturing C 
I3 production and supply of electric power, gas and water D 
I4 construction E 
I5 transportation and warehousing F 
I6 wholesale and retail trade H 
I7 real estate J 
I8 
social services: 
science, education, culture and health 
leasing and business service 
communication and publication 
K,L 
I9 
others: (any, some or all of the following) 
farming, forestry, husbandry and fishing 
information technology 
finance and insurance 
comprehensive industry 
A,G,I,M 
 
Concerning the most important issue in calculation of risk-adjusted HHI is to estimate sector betas. We 
choose Shanghai composite index as proxy as market return since it covers a wider range thus better describe 
the market.  
2
cov (R ,R )
=
Mt
Mt it
it
R
is used to estimate sector betas. Original beta values of Sector B, C, D, E, F, H, and J is 
used. Average of Sector K and L is replaced with I8 in our new standard. For I9, we calculate beta of each bank 
according to the sectors included in “others” category (one, some or all of Sector A, G, I, M) by averaging their 
betas. For example, we classify Sector I and M for BOC into I9 “others”, average beta of Sector I and M is 
used to replace I9’s beta.  
4. Empirical results 
We present the results of our empirical regression models in this section. In the first subsection, we examine 
the effect of credit portfolio diversification on banks’ return performance. In the second subsection, we analyze 
the effects of diversification on risk. 
Panel data models are used to analyze the two issues. We test the presence of unit root for the variables 
including those we are interested and control variables, but we reject unit root in all cases. Our sample includes 
all the Chinese listed commercial banks. So it is safe for us to choose fixed effect models for regressions. We 
also apply Hausman test for all the models to validate our choice. 
4.1.  The relationship between bank returns and credit portfolio diversification 
We try to investigate the effects of credit portfolio diversification measured by HHI and risk-adjusted HHI 
on ROA and then ROE, respectively, while controlling the bank’s size, the equity ratio and the loan-to-deposit 
ratio. To capture the potential nonlinear relationship between sectoral diversification and return performance, 
we also estimate equation with squared term of HHI and risk-adjusted HHI. Table 2 presents the results of 
regression model Eq.(5) and Eq.(6). 
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In the specification Eq.(5), the coefficients for risk-adjusted HHI are positive and significant at 5% level for 
return performance measured both by ROA and ROE. HHI is also positive and significant at 10% level when 
ROE is the dependent variable.  Risk-adjusted HHI is better to capture the relation between credit 
diversification and return measure when systematic risk is taken into consideration. However, in estimation of 
Eq.(6), both the original and squared term of HHI and risk-adjusted HHI reject the significance, while control 
variables remain significant. This suggests that there is no nonlinear relationship between diversification and 
return performance. 
The above results give evidence that concentration seems to influence positively banks’ return but not in a 
nonlinear form, indicating that on average, focused credit portfolio to fewer sectors yields higher profits than 
diversified portfolio. One of the most possible reason is that diversification may result in higher monitoring 
costs, which reduces the overall profits [7]. Banks may have an expertise on some of the sectors, but not all. 
Thus involving more sectors means more costly to monitor. 
The coefficients of the bank’s size remain positive and strongly significant in all the 8 models, which tends 
to suggest that larger banks have higher return performance than smaller banks. In addition, the coefficients of 
equity ratio are significantly positive in ROA estimations and significantly negative in ROE estimations. This 
indicates that an increase of equity ratio, which changes the capital structure, helps to achieve higher asset 
return but have a negative effect in the management of equity. This is also the case in Brazil, another emerging 
country, agreed by the previous literatures [10, 16]. 
4.2. The impact of credit portfolio diversification on bank risk 
In this part, our goal is to evaluate the effects of credit portfolio diversification measured by HHI and risk-
adjusted HHI on banks’ risk, proxied by nonperforming loan (in absolute value), while controlling the bank’s 
size, the equity ratio and the loan-to-deposit ratio. Note that we also try to introduce squared term   along with 
to describe the potential nonlinear relationship between size and risk when the linear relationship is not 
significant. To capture the potential nonlinear relationship between sectoral diversification and risk, we also 
estimate equation with squared term of HHI and risk-adjusted HHI. 
Table 3 presents the results of regression model Eq.(7) and Eq.(8). Regarding the portfolio diversification 
measure, in the specification Eq.(7), the coefficients for risk-adjusted HHI are positive and significant at 5% 
level to bank’s risk both when bank’s size is proxied by asset absolute value and by squared term 2ln ( )asset  
along with ln( )asset . HHI is also positive and significant at 10% level when bank’s size is described by 
2ln ( )asset and ln( )asset . However, in estimation of Eq.(8), significance of nonlinear form of HHI and risk-
adjusted HHI are both rejected. This suggests that there is no significant nonlinear relationship between 
diversification and risk measure. 
These results provide evidence that portfolio concentration significantly positively related to the bank’s risk, 
which is in agreement with the idea of Diamond, stating that the expansion of banks’ credit lines to new sectors 
reduced the bank’s probability of default [4]. But our findings contradict the conclusions that concentration 
reduces risk from other existing research works in both developed and developing countries [7, 10, 13]. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper investigates the effects of credit portfolio sectoral diversification on the banks’ return and risk in 
Chinese banking sector. Panel data on 16 Chinese listed commercial banks during the 2007-2011 period is used 
for analysis. We construct a new diversification measure, taking systematic risk of different sectors into 
consideration by weighting them with their betas and compare the results to those of more conventional 
measure HHI. We find that Chinese banks’ credit loan portfolios are more diversified than all the countries’ 
reported in previous studies, which may be due to strict regulation and supervision of our country. 
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Our main finding of empirical study is that sectoral diversification is associated with reduced return and also 
reduced risk at the same time, which contradicts existing findings in developed countries such as Italy and 
Germany, and also in emerging economies such as Brazil and Argentina. The reason to explain this may be that 
diversification may result in higher monitoring costs, which reduces the overall profits. At the same time, 
diversification helps offset the specific risks to achieve lower risks. The overall effects of Chinese sectoral 
diversification versus concentration on banks seems to be ambiguous and cannot be determined without taking 
a stand on what consists an efficient risk-return trade-offs. 
Our analysis may also provide important implication for regulators and policy makers in other emerging 
economies. From the aspect of regulators, it is more important to control risk to ensure financial stability than 
high profits of the banking industry. Therefore, we suggest setting limits on those sectors with higher 
systematic such as real estate to avoid “second subprime tragedy”. For those large banks, which are less 
vulnerable to risk, it is possible for them to be moderately focused especially on those they have expertise on to 
reduce cost in order to achieve higher return. 
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